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Summary
A mathematical model is presented for the evolution of situation awareness within the context
of human performance modelling in accident risk assessment for ATM. Various aspects of
situation awareness are defined within a group of agents, such as human operators and technical
systems. Application of the model is illustrated for an accident risk assessment of an active
runway crossing operation.
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1 Introduction
Since capacity and efficiency are the drivers of the development of advanced air traffic
operations, by now there is a broad consensus that appropriate accident risk assessment models
are needed to assess safety in relation to capacity with the aim to optimise advanced air traffic
operations [1], [2], [3]. Air traffic operations account for highly distributed interactions between
human operators, procedures and technical systems. As such, the safety of an air traffic
operation depends not only on the functioning of its individual elements, but also on their
complex interactions, especially in non-nominal situations. Because of this distributed control
nature of air traffic, established techniques fall short in performing accident risk assessment. In
[4] this problem has been addressed with the development of a stochastic analysis based
methodology that takes an integral approach towards accident risk assessment for air traffic.
A crucial issue in accident risk assessment for air traffic operations is the appropriate
incorporation of the human factors. Hence, there is a clear need for a modelling approach to
assess and understand accident risk in relation to the performance of the human operators
involved. This means that appropriate human performance models are required that describe
human cognitive and responsibility principles up to the level of accident risk. In [5] and [6] we
have started the development of an approach for human performance modelling in accident risk
assessment for air traffic management. This resulted in a successful integration of several
psychological models, i.e. Wickens’s Multiple Resources model [7], human error and error
correction modelling [8], [9], and Hollnagel’s Contextual Control Mode model [10], and a
successful use of these models in accident risk assessment applications.
In the literature it is well recognised that situation awareness (SA) and the lack of or errors in
SA are important contributing factors to many accidents [11], [12], [13]. Moreover, our own
finding is that during hazard identification brainstorm sessions with operational experts, many
of the identified hazards appear to be of SA error evolution type. In such case there is a root
cause, often so minor that it goes unnoticed initially. However, the multi-agent interactions
cause an evolution over time which amplifies the root cause into  significant differences in the
SA of the agents. In such case the SA of at least one of the agents is erroneous. Hence, in the
context of accident risk assessment there exists a major interest in errors in situation awareness
and the relation of these errors to accidents.
Endsley [11] defines SA as follows:
Situation awareness is the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time
and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near
future.
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Furthermore, the process of achieving, acquiring and maintaining situation awareness is referred
to as situation assessment [11]. Following these definitions, SA is a dynamic state of knowledge
which discerns three levels:
1. perception of elements in the environment,
2. comprehension of the current situation,
3. projection of the future status.
Endsley [11] discusses errors in SA at these three levels, and clearly distinguishes incomplete
SA (knowledge of only some elements) from inaccurate SA (erroneous knowledge concerning
the value of some elements). At level 1, a person may wrongly or not perceive task-relevant
information. This may depend on, e.g., related signal characteristics, perception strategies in
complex environments and expectations. At level 2, a person may wrongly interpret perceived
information. This may depend on, e.g., the miss-use or non-existence of proper mental models
of the environment. At level 3, a person may wrongly predict a future status, for instance, due to
lack of a good mental model or memory limitations.
In addition to these SA error categories, in a multi-agent environment such as air traffic is, one
should be aware that errors in SA may evolve due to intra-agent interaction, such as
communication, without erroneous perception, interpretation or prediction processes. For
instance, an agent may have received erroneous or incomplete information from another agent.
These types of SA errors may contribute importantly to accident risk.
Another important issue is that in air traffic there also are interactions with agents that are not
human, while the SA definition provided by Endsley [11] implicitly considers environment
knowledge of human agents only. Hence, for the formulation of SA in this paper we will use the
concept of agent to come up with a more general group of entities that may have SA, on the one
hand, and to define the environment for which SA is attained, on the other hand. An agent is an
entity such as a human operator or a technical system, which may possess SA of the
environment. For the definition of the environment we consider a group of agents. The
environment of each agent consists of the complete group of agents.
The aim of the current paper is to extend the human performance modelling approach in
quantitative accident risk assessment in [5] and [6] with a model for Multi-Agent Situation
Awareness Error Evolution. Our approach has much in common with the Updateable World
Representation (UWR) in MIDAS [14]. By exploiting a mathematical modelling framework it
has enhanced capabilities in managing the complexity in multi-agent SA error evolution
modelling.
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This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the air traffic operation example for
which the modelling approach will be illustrated. Section 3 discusses the agents in the air traffic
operation considered. Section 4 provides a mathematical model of situation awareness and
situation assessment in a group of agents. Section 5 describes the integration of the SA models
with other human performance models. Section 6 presents the accident risk decomposition for
the accident risk model. Section 7 provides results of this accident risk model. Concluding
remarks are given in Section 8.
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2 An active runway crossing operation
In this paper the situation awareness modelling approach will be illustrated for an active runway
crossing operation. This example accounts for a considerable number of interacting agents. The
runway configuration of the active runway crossing operation considered is shown in Figure 1.
The configuration takes into account one runway, named Runway A, with holdings, crossings
and exits. The crossings enable traffic between the aprons and a second runway, named Runway
B. Each crossing has remotely controlled stopbars on both sides of the runway. Also the
holdings have remotely controlled stopbars and each exit has a fixed stopbar.
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Figure 1: Runway configuration of active runway crossing procedure.
The involved human operators include the start-up controller, the ground controller, the Runway
A controller, the Runway B controller, the departure controller, and the pilots flying and pilots
not flying of taking off aircraft and crossing aircraft. The active runway crossing operation is
considered under good visibility condition only, enabling pilots and controllers to monitor the
traffic situation via direct visual observation.
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Communication between controllers and aircraft crews is via standard VHF R/T.
Communication between controllers is supported by telephone lines. Monitoring by the
controllers can be by direct visual observation and is supported by radar track plots. The
Runway A controller is supported by a runway incursion alert system and a stopbar violation
alert system. The Runway A controller manages the remotely controlled stopbars and the
runway lighting. Monitoring by the aircraft crews is by visual observation and is supported by
the VHF R/T party-line effect.
In the runway crossing operation considered, the control over the crossing aircraft is transferred
from the ground controller or the Runway B controller (depending on the direction of the
runway crossing) to the Runway A controller. If the Runway A controller is aware that the
runway is not used for a take-off, the crew of an aircraft intending to cross is cleared to do so
and the remotely controlled stopbar is switched off. The Pilot-Not-Flying of the crossing aircraft
acknowledges the clearance and then the Pilot-Flying initiates the runway crossing. When the
crossing aircraft has vacated the runway, then the Pilot-Not-Flying reports this to the Runway A
Controller. Next the control over the aircraft is transferred from the Runway A controller to
either the Runway B controller or the ground controller.
-10-
NLR-TP-2003-536
3 Multiple agents in the model
The model for the active runway crossing operation described in Section 2 includes the
following agents (see also Figure 2), where an agent is an entity that has elements of a situation
awareness model as defined in Section 4:
• aircraft (taking off or taxiing),
• aircraft’s flight management systems (FMS),
• pilots flying (PF’s),
• pilots not flying (PNF’s),
• Runway A controller,
• Runway B controller,
• ground controller,
• departure controller,
• start-up controller,
• ATC system, which is broadly defined to include:
- airport manoeuvre control systems,
- surveillance systems,
- airport configuration,
- environmental conditions,
- communication systems.
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System
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Figure 2: Relations between agents identified for the active runway crossing operation. The
index is denotes an aircraft starting (taking off) from runway A and the index iT  denotes an
aircraft taxiing across Runway A.
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Prior to the development of a quantitative accident risk model, for the active runway crossing
operation considered a qualitative accident risk assessment has been performed. It follows from
this qualitative study that of all identified conflict scenarios, there are three conflict scenarios
which may pose unacceptable safety effects. In this paper, we focus on the details of a
quantitative accident risk model for one of these conflict scenarios. In this conflict scenario
there is one aircraft that takes off and has been allowed to do so and there is one aircraft that
crosses the runway while it should not. The visibility conditions are assumed to be good.
Taxiing along a straight line over one of the standard runway crossings (i.e., via C1, C2, D1 or
D2 in Figure 1) is considered. Hence, in the illustrative example of this paper, emphasis is
placed on the models of the aircraft, pilot flying, Runway A controller and ATC system agents.
Aircraft
A taking-off aircraft initiates take-off from a position at the beginning of the runway. A crossing
aircraft initiates crossing at a position close to the remotely controlled stopbar with a normal
taxiing speed or from a hold state.
Pilot flying of taking off aircraft
Initially, the pilot flying (PF) of a taking off aircraft has the SA that take-off is allowed and
initiates a take-off. During the take-off the PF monitors the traffic situation on the runway
visually and via the VHF communication channel. The PF starts a collision avoidance braking
action if a crossing aircraft is observed within a critical distance from the runway centre-line or
in reaction to an ATCo clearance, and it is decided that braking will stop the aircraft in front of
the crossing aircraft.
Pilot flying of crossing aircraft
Initially, the PF has the intent SA that the next airport way-point is either a regular taxiway or a
runway crossing. In the former case the PF proceeds taxiing and in the latter case the PF may
have the SA that crossing is allowed. The characteristics of the visual monitoring process of the
PF depend on the intent SA. In case of awareness of a conflict, either due to own visual
observation or due to an ATCo call, the PF stops the aircraft, unless it is already within a critical
distance from the runway centre-line.
Runway A controller
The Runway A controller visually monitors the traffic and has support from a stopbar violation
alert and a runway incursion alert. If the ATCo is aware that a crossing aircraft has passed the
stopbar, a hold clearance is specified to both the crossing and the taking off aircraft.
ATC system
The ATC system includes communication systems, tracking systems, a stopbar violation alert, a
runway incursion alert and remotely controlled stopbars.
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4 Modelling situation awareness
A general mathematical representation for the situation awareness (SA) of agent k at time t
consists of a column of SA subprocesses:
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with the following SA components:
• kti ,

 denotes the awareness by agent k at time t of the identity of other agents. For example,
it may represent the awareness of a pilot concerning the identity code of a nearby aircraft.
• ktx ,

 denotes the awareness by agent k at time t of continuous-valued state components of
other agents. For example, it may represent the awareness by a runway controller of the
position and velocity of an aircraft.
• kt,θ

 denotes the awareness by agent k at time t of discrete-valued state components (modes)
of other agents. For example, it may represent the awareness of an air traffic controller of
mode of an alert.
• kt ,υ

 denotes the awareness by agent k at time t of the intent of other agents. The intent kt ,υ

has various elements, which represent the anticipation by agent k at time t of modes and
continuous states of other agents, and related times at which these modes or continuous
states are expected to be achieved. These elements are fully specified in Appendix A. For
example, it may represent the expectations by a runway controller of the mode of an aircraft
(e.g., ‘ground run’, ‘hold’, ‘airborne’), a way-point of an aircraft and the passage time of a
way-point by an aircraft.
Each component of kt ,σ  may take values in its normal state space enlarged with }{⋅ ,
representing an unknown. The first three components of the SA column (i.e., all but the intent)
is named ‘state SA’. The fourth component is named ‘intent SA’.
Situation assessment
Achieving, acquiring and maintaining situation awareness is a dynamic process, which is
sometimes referred to as situation assessment [11]. In the current paper this dynamic process is
mathematically formulated by considering, firstly, a number of types of SA updating processes
and, secondly, an SA updating scheduling process, which specifies the times at which the SA
becomes updated. The application of situation assessment processes for the active runway
crossing accident risk model, including the relation other human performance models will be
presented in Section 5.
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SA updating
The following updating processes for the situation awareness of an agent are considered:
1. observation,
2. communication, and
3. reasoning.
Implications of these processes for the update of SA components are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
Observation
An update of the SA of agent k via observation can be represented by an observation mapping
)(obs ⋅kf :
     ),,,,( ,,
obs
, kttttktkkt
xif εθσσ
−
= ,
where −t denotes the time just before the update, ti  is the actual identity of an observed agent,
tx  is the actual continuous state of an observed agent, tθ is the actual mode of an observed
agent  and kt,ε  represents stochastic effects that may influence the observation process. The
variable kt,ε  may, for instance, be assumed to depend on noise, perception errors and the
cognitive mode of a human operator.
Communication
An update of the SA of agent k1 via communication with agent k2 can be represented by a
communication mapping )(
com
, 21
⋅kkf :
),,(
2121
211 ,,,,
com
,, kktktkt
kkkt
f εσσσ
−
= ,
which states that the update of situation awareness of agent k1 is depends on the previous SA of
agent k1, on the SA of agent k2 and on a stochastic variable 21 ,, kktε , which may, e.g., be
assumed to depend on noise and the cognitive mode of the human operators involved.
Reasoning
An update of SA of agent k via reasoning can be represented by a reasoning mapping )(rea ⋅kf :
),( ,,
rea
, ktkt
kkt f εσσ −= ,
which only depends on the previous SA and a stochastic component kt,ε .
SA update scheduling
The SA updating scheduling process determines the times at which the SA is updated by one of
the SA updating processes. This scheduling process may vary considerably for various types of
agents. In general, the SA updating scheduling process can be seen as part of the overall task
scheduling process.
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A high-level representation of the task scheduling process of an agent can be represented by
the combination of a task triggering process and a task scheduling process. The task triggering
process for task q of agent k specifies times when it is desired to complete the task:
),( ,,
trigger
,
trigger
, ktktqkqk ft ησ= ,
and may depend of the SA of the agent and other agent specific variables kt ,η . The task
scheduling process specifies times at which the SA may be updated as a result of task q:
),,( ,
trigger
,,
schedupdate
, ktqkktkqk tft ησ= ,
and may depend on the SA of the agent, the task triggering times and other agent specific
variables kt ,η (e.g., cognitive mode, task processing behaviour).
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5 Integration of situation awareness with other human performance models
In this section we will describe how the elements of the SA modelling approach are included in
the human operators’ models for the agents of the active runway crossing operation and how
these SA models interact with other cognitive performance models of the human operators
considered.
The development of the human operator models is based on the situation awareness modelling
approach presented in the previous sections and the human cognition modelling methods
presented in [5].
Specifically, for a human operator
 a decomposition of the tasks of the human operator is identified,
 the most essential cognitive control modes are identified,
 the characteristics of the operator tasks are identified for the most important cognitive
control modes,
 clusters of tasks are identified,
 hierarchy and concurrency for the task clusters are identified.
These model development steps, including the situation awareness representation, give rise to a
model structure that is similar for each of the human operators. As an illustrative example, we
will use the model of the pilot flying of an aircraft that taxies towards the runway crossing. A
high-level overview of the model elements of the pilot flying agent is shown in Figure 3.
Crossing
Actions
Takeoff
Actions
Runway
Taxiing
Actions
Taxiway
Taxiing
Actions
Conflict
Actions
Intent SA
State SA
Coordination
Generator
Monitoring
Generator
Conflict
Detection
Task
Scheduling
Cognitive
Mode
Task 
Performance
Figure 3: High-level overview of the model elements of the pilot flying agent.
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The human operator models include the following groups of model elements.
Task triggering
Task triggering processes specify times at which it is desired to complete a task. They may
depend on other processes, such as task performance and situation awareness. For example, the
model blocks Monitoring Generator and Coordination Generator in Figure 3 represent task
triggering processes of a PF and specify times at which monitoring of the traffic situation and
coordination with the PNF is desired, respectively. These model blocks receive several inputs.
For instance, the dependence of Monitoring Generator from Intent SA enables an intent-
dependent visual updating frequency.
Task scheduling
Task scheduling processes determine which tasks should currently be processed by the human
operator. Task scheduling processes may depend on other processes, e.g., task triggering, task
performance and situation awareness processes. For example, in Figure 3 the Task Scheduling
block represents a scheduling process with a fixed hierarchy and concurrency structure.
Task performance
Task performance processes describe the development of the progress of a task. They may, e.g.,
depend on task scheduling and cognitive mode processes. For example, in Figure 3 the Task
Performance block depends on the Cognitive Mode block, resulting in a faster task performance
in the opportunistic control mode with respect to the tactical control mode of the pilot flying.
Cognitive control mode
Cognitive control mode processes describe the cognitive control mode of the human operator.
They may, e.g., depend on the number and types of scheduled tasks. See, for instance, the
Cognitive Mode block in Figure 3.
Situation awareness
Situation awareness model elements represent the state SA and intent SA, as outlined in Section
4. In Figure 3, the model blocks State SA, Intent SA and Conflict Detection represent SA
components. Here, the Conflict Detection block represents the detection process and the SA of a
conflict. In Figure 3, the State SA block depends on the Cognitive Mode block, representing that
(errors in) the state SA updating process can depend on the cognitive mode.
Task specific actions
Task specific actions represent particular elements of tasks of a human operator. For instance,
for a pilot flying these may include (see Figure 3) Crossing Actions, Takeoff Actions, Runway
Taxiing Actions, Taxiway Taxiing Actions and Conflict Actions.
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6 Accident risk model
For the conflict scenario considered, an accident risk model has been developed represents using
the mathematical modelling formalism of Dynamically Coloured Petri Nets [14]. It represents
nominal and non-nominal behaviour of the agents discussed. In the present model version most
emphasis is placed on the models of the aircraft, pilot flying, Runway A controller and ATC
system agents [16].
Furthermore, an accident risk decomposition has been developed in [16], which is required to
efficiently evaluate the collision risk and to promote insight in the risk contributions. The
evaluation of the collision risk is based on the probabilities and the conditional collision risks of
combinations of event sequences, as have been identified in the decomposition process. The
decomposition process considers whether alert systems, remotely controlled stopbar and
communication systems are functioning well or not. In particular, the decomposition process
considers
• the aircraft type of each aircraft to be either a medium-weight Airbus A320 or a heavy-
weight Boeing 747;
• the intent SA of the PF of a crossing aircraft concerning the next way-point (Taxiway /
Crossing) and concerning allowance of runway crossing (Allowed / Not Allowed);
• whether alert systems are functioning well or not;
• whether the remotely controlled stopbar is functioning well or not;
• whether communication systems are functioning well or not.
The present version of the model of the active runway crossing procedure accounts for intent-
dependent and cognitive mode-dependent error-prone perception processes of pilots flying and
the Runway A controller. Table 1 shows how a number of situation awareness related hazards
of the operation considered were accounted for in the quantitative accident risk model.
Table 1: Examples of the representation of SA related hazards in the accident risk model of the
active runway crossing procedure.
SA hazard Model representation
Runway incursion alert is active, but runway
controller has wrong ‘picture’ of the situation, and
therefore reacts too late, not or wrongly.
In response to an alert there is a chance that the
runway controller does not observe the conflict
and therefore does not react.
Pilots get confused because of complexity of the
taxiways in the new operation.
The PF of a taxiing aircraft may be aware that the
aircraft is taxiing on a regular taxiway while it
actually is on a runway crossing.
Pilot reacts not, wrongly, too late or cannot react
to conflict solving clearance of runway controller.
There is a chance that the PF does not or only after
a long time becomes aware of a clearance.
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7 Preliminary risk results for the active runway crossing operation model
Using the detailed mathematical formulation of the accident risk model for the active runway
crossing procedure [16], of which elements have been introduced in Section 3, Monte Carlo
simulation software was developed to evaluate the conditional collision risk for the events
resulting form the decomposition process. Some initial results of the model are presented in this
section. They have a preliminary status, because the model has not been reviewed by
operational experts and a bias and uncertainty assessment [17] for the model results remains to
be done.
Table 2 provides collision risk results for a crossing distance of 1000 m from the runway
threshold. It specifies the total collision risk as well as risk contributions for certain events. It
follows from Table 2 that events for which the PF of a crossing aircraft has the intent SA to
proceed on a regular taxiway rather than a runway crossing contribute largely (92.1%).
Furthermore, it follows from Table 2 that (non-nominal) events in which alerting systems or
communication systems are not functioning well, hardly contribute to the accident risk. It
implies that the failure probabilities of these systems may be extensively larger before they will
make a significant contribution to the accident risk.
Table 2: Initial results of the accident risk model for the active runway crossing procedure. The
column ‘Events’ specifies some event types, the column ‘Risk’ specifies the collision risk
contribution for each event, and the last column gives the relative risk.
Events Risk (per take-off) Relative risk
All 1.1 10
-8
100%
Taxiway 1.0 10-8 92.1%Intent PF taxiing a/c
Crossing 8.8 10-10 7.9%
Up 1.1 10-8 99.99%Alerting systems
Down 5.7 10-13 0.0052%
Up 1.1 10-8 99.99%Comm. systems
Down 1.4 10-12 0.012%
In the model, the accident risk is dominated by events which are nominal, except for the intent
SA of the PF of the crossing aircraft regarding the next airport way-point. The events that are
nominal concern the remotely controlled stopbar (On), the alerting systems of the runway
controller (Working), ATC communication systems (Up) and aircraft type (Airbus A320 or
Boeing 747). In Table 3 probability metrics are gathered for event groups nominaltaxiwayK  and
nominal
crossingK  of runway crossings while all events are nominal and with the intent SA of the PF of
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the crossing aircraft regarding the next way-point being either Taxiway or Crossing,
respectively. It follows from Table 3 that the large contribution from events with the intent SA
being Taxiway is due to the largely enhanced conditional collision risk for this situation by
about a factor 73, rather due to the event probability, which is about a factor 5.7 smaller. The
enhanced conditional collision risk for the situation considered is due to the intent SA adapted
monitoring process of the PF of the crossing aircraft.
Table 3: Probability metrics for two main groups of events contributing to the accident risk. The
probabilities are specified as occurrence per take-off and are initial model results.
Event combinationsProbability metric
nominal
taxiwayK
nominal
crossingK
Event condition 3.5 10
-5
2.0 10
-4
Conditional collision risk 2.9 10
-4
4.0 10
-6
Collision risk 1.0 10
-8
8.0 10
-10
Contr. to  total collision risk 92.1 % 7.1 %
The effect on conflict resolution of the various human operators can be determined in the model.
Table 4 shows estimates of conflict resolution probabilities of the pilots of both aircraft together
and of the runway controller. It follows that for the operation considered the pilots contribute
largely to successful conflict resolution, where the success rate is strongly determined by the
intent SA of the PF of the crossing aircraft. A remarkable result from the model is (see Table 4),
that the runway controller on average hardly contributes to conflict resolution in addition to the
conflicts detected and resolved by the pilots themselves.
Table 4: Conflict resolution probabilities (initial results) of involved human operators for some
conditions.
Human operators Condition Conflict resolution
probability
Pilots of both aircraft Intent = Taxiway 0.996
Pilots of both aircraft Intent = Crossing 0.99997
Runway controller Conflict not resolved by pilots 0.15
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8 Concluding remarks
We have developed a mathematical model for situation awareness and situation assessment in a
multi-agent environment. The development of this framework was stimulated by our
recognition that situation awareness errors evolution in a multi-agent environment plays a key
role in ATM accident risk models.
The components of the mathematical SA representation account for a multi-agent environment,
are time-dependent and include agent identity, continuous state variables, mode variables and
intent variables. Here, an agent may represent a human operator or a technical system, leading
to an enhanced definition of entities that may have SA. Given the SA components, for each
agent it may represent the perceived and interpreted status (continuous-valued state and mode
variables) and the status in the near future (intent variables). Thus it can account for the SA
elements in the definition of Endsley [11], which was given in Section 1. Naturally, the exact
definition of the SA subprocesses depends on the application at hand.
The feasibility of this framework has been illustrated for an accident risk model of an active
runway crossing operation. This example accounts for a considerable number of interacting
agents. The preliminary results obtained indicate that the situation awareness model can be
combined well with other human performance models, and that the intent–dependent situation
assessment process of the pilot flying of a crossing aircraft has a major effect on the accident
risk.
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Appendix A Mathematical representation of multi-agent situation awareness
SA in a group of multiple agents
To complete the definition of SA in a group of agents we specify the identity of an agent by a
pair of indices (h,i) or (l,j). The first element of each index pair (h or l) indicates the type of the
agent and the second element of each index pair (i or j) indicates a (serial) number or code of
the agent. For example, in the context of ATM, h or l may be ‘pilot flying’, ‘aircraft’ or ‘air
traffic controller’, and i or j may be an aircraft’s call-sign if the agent type is aircraft or pilot
flying, and type of controller (e.g., ‘runway’, ‘departure’, ‘start-up’) if the agent is an air traffic
controller.
Using these indices, the situation awareness held by an agent ),( jlk ≡  at time t concerning
an agent (h,i) is given by the column of SA subprocesses:
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Intent SA
The intent SA ih jlt
,
,,υ

 is represented by a matrix that consists of a number of ordered columns of
intent SA subprocesses p
ih
jlt )(
,
,,υ

:
p
ih
jlt
ih
jlt
ih
jlt
p
ih
jlt
t
x
¸
¸
¸
¹
·
¨
¨
¨
©
§
=
,
,,
,
,,
,
,,
,
,, )( 

θ
υ .
The elements of the intent SA matrix represent the following aspects.
• p
ih
jlt )(
,
,,θ  denotes a mode of agent (h,i) that is anticipated by agent (l,j). For example, it may
represent the expectation of the mode of the aircraft (e.g., ‘ground run’, ‘hold’, ‘airborne’)
by a runway controller.
• p
ih
jltx )(
,
,,  denotes a continuous-valued state component of agent (h,i) that is anticipated by
agent (l,j). For example, it may represent the expectation of a way-point of an aircraft by a
runway controller.
• p
ih
jltt )(
,
,,

 denotes the expectation of agent (l,j), held at time t, concerning the time at which
the continuous-valued state component p
ih
jltx )(
,
,,  will be attained, or the expectation of the
time up to which the mode p
ih
jlt )(
,
,,θ  will be attained by agent (h,i). For example, it may
represent the expectation by a controller of the passage time of a way-point by an aircraft.
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For a more precise definition for the relation between the intent SA components a stopping time
p
ih
jl )(
,
,τ  is used.
If p
ih
jltx )(
,
,,  is specified, then
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,
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,
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else (i.e., if }{)( ,, ⋅=p
ih
jlx )
p
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jltp
ih
jl t )ˆ()(
,
,,
,
, =τ .
Using this stopping time, the intent SA for the mode of agent (h,i) now is
p
ih
jlp
ih
jlp
ih
jlt
ih
jlt t )()(for )(
,
,1
,
,
,
,,
,
,, ττθθ <≤= − .
For example, in the context of ATM, a pilot flying of an aircraft who intends to subsequently
taxi over a taxiway segment T1, taxi via a runway crossing C1, taxi towards a runway holding
H1 and take-off at a time off-taket

 may have the following intent:
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Appendix B List of symbols
)(
com
, 21
⋅kkf Mapping describing situation awareness update of agent k1 via
communication with agent k2.
)(obs ⋅kf Mapping describing situation awareness update of agent k via
observation.
)(rea ⋅kf Mapping describing situation awareness update of agent k via reasoning.
)(sched ⋅kf Mapping specifying the situation awareness updating time of agent k as
the result of the completion of a task.
)(trigger, ⋅qkf Mapping specifying the desired completion time of task q by agent k.
ti Actual identity of an agent
kti ,

Awareness by agent k at time t of the identity of other agents.
ih
jlti
,
,,

Awareness by agent (l,j) at time t of the identity of agent (h,i).
−t Time just before update of situation awareness.
trigger
,qkt Desired completion time of task q by agent k.
update
,qkt Situation awareness updating time of agent k as a result of the completion
of task q.
p
ih
jlt )(
,
,

Expectation of agent (l,j) concerning the time at which the continuous-
valued state component p
ih
jlx )(
,
,  will be attained, or the expectation of the
time up to which the mode p
ih
jl )(
,
,θ  will be attained by agent (h,i).
tx Actual continuous-valued state component of an agent.
ktx ,

Awareness by agent k at time t of continuous-valued state components of
other agents.
ih
jltx
,
,,

Awareness by agent (l,j) at time t of continuous-valued state component
of agent (h,i).
p
ih
jlx )(
,
, Continuous-valued state component of agent (h,i) that is anticipated by
agent (l,j).
kt ,ε Stochastic contribution in update of situation awareness by agent k via
observation or reasoning.
21 ,, kkt
ε Stochastic contribution in update of situation awareness by agent k1 via
communication with agent k2.
kt ,η Agent k specific variables that influence agent task triggering and task
scheduling processes.
tθ Actual mode of an agent.
kt,θ

Awareness by agent k at time t of modes of other agents.
ih
jlt
,
,,θ

Awareness by agent (l,j) at time t of modes of agent (h,i).
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p
ih
jl )(
,
,θ Mode of agent (h,i) that is anticipated by agent (l,j).
kt ,σ Situation awareness of agent k at time t.
ih
jlt
,
,,σ Situation awareness of agent ),( jl  at time t concerning agent (h,i)
p
ih
jl )(
,
,τ Stopping time for the definition of the situation awareness of agent (l,j)
concerning the pth mode or way-point intended by agent (h,i).
kt ,υ

Awareness by agent k at time t of the intent of other agents.
ih
jlt
,
,,υ

Awareness by agent (l,j) at time t of the intent of agent (h,i).
